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Abstract: Experimental research suggests that people draw a moral distinction between 
bad outcomes brought about as a means versus a side effect (or byproduct). Such 
findings have informed multiple psychological and philosophical debates about moral 
cognition, including its computational structure, its sensitivity to the famous Doctrine of 
Double Effect, its reliability, and its status as a universal and innate mental module akin 
to universal grammar. But some studies have failed to replicate the means/byproduct 
effect especially in the absence of other factors, such as personal contact. So we aimed 
to determine how robust the means/byproduct effect is by conducting a meta-analysis of 
both published and unpublished studies (k = 101; 24,058 participants). We found that 
while there is an overall small difference between moral judgments of means and 
byproducts (standardized mean difference = 0.87, 95% CI 0.67 – 1.06; standardized 
mean change = 0.57, 95% CI 0.44 – 0.69; log odds ratio = 1.59, 95% CI 1.15 – 2.02), 
the mean effect size is primarily moderated by whether the outcome is brought about by 
personal contact, which typically involves the use of personal force. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many people find it morally questionable for physicians to kill their terminally ill patients as a 
means to ending suffering, even when patients competently request it. That’s active euthanasia, 
which is illegal in many countries. Yet in the same jurisdictions it is typically legal for 
physicians to commence palliative care that merely has the known side effect of hastening a 
terminal patient’s death. The distinction between harming as a means and harming as a 
byproduct can also be observed when the stakes are much lower. Some experimental studies 
suggest that people regard destroying one piece of property as a means to saving five other 
pieces of property as morally worse than sacrificing one as a mere side effect (or byproduct) of 
saving the greater goods (e.g. Millar et al 2014). Suppose, for example, that you can save 
someone’s five rare books by diverting some spilled bleach that’s fast approaching them. It may 
                                                
1 Authorship is equal; author names are ordered alphabetically by surname. 
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seem morally acceptable to save these books, even if you know that as a side effect the caustic 
liquid will then flow toward just one rare book and destroy it. But it strikes many as less morally 
appropriate to save the five if doing so involves using someone else’s beloved book as a means 
to diverting the bleach.  
The distinction fits with a venerable theory in moral philosophy that is associated with 
the Doctrine of Double Effect. The Doctrine is complicated and variously formulated. John 
Mikhail (2011: 149), for example, articulates it as follows:  
 
[A]n otherwise prohibited action, such as battery or homicide, which has both good and 
bad effects may be permissible if the prohibited act itself is not directly intended, the 
good but not the bad effects are directly intended, the good effects outweigh the bad 
effects, and no morally preferable alternative is available.  
 
A core element of any formulation of the Doctrine is something like the means/byproduct 
distinction, embodied in what we can dub the Means Principle: all else being equal, bringing 
about a bad outcome as a means to a noble goal is morally worse, or more difficult to justify, 
than bringing about the same outcome as a side effect (McIntyre 2001; Mikhail 2011; 
Wedgwood 2011).2 Some, especially those in the Catholic tradition, have used the Doctrine to 
reconcile the ideas that a human fetus is a person, it’s always wrong to intentionally kill an 
innocent person, but it’s sometimes permissible to save the life of a mother via hysterectomy 
even knowing that this will have the side effect of killing the fetus (Foot 1967). Killing someone 
as a mere byproduct of a worthy goal may be justified, according to Double Effect, given that 
only the good effect of one’s action is intended. Many proponents of the Doctrine, however, are 
secular. Indeed, something like the Means Principle is arguably presupposed in many aspects of 
American criminal law (Sarch in press) and is codified in the American Medical Association 
(AMA Opinion 2.21). 
Whether the Means Principle plays a role in ordinary moral thinking has implications for 
longstanding debates in philosophy, psychology, and public policy. First, arguments in favor of 
Double Effect have commonly rested on it explaining firm commonsense intuitions about cases 
(e.g. Foot 1967; McIntyre 2001; Scanlon 2008; Wedgwood 2011; Nelkin & Rickless 2014). Such 
arguments suffer if our basic mode of moral thinking is not committed to the significance of the 
means/byproduct distinction. Second, the Means Principle may serve to underwrite conceptions 
of moral cognition as involving tacit computation (Cushman et al 2006) that is perhaps universal 
and innate (Hauser et al 2007; Mikhail 2011). Third, many who have attempted to empirically 
debunk deontological or non-utilitarian ways of thinking have regarded the Means Principle as a 
core element of the targeted approach to ethics, since it treats more than outcomes as morally 
significant (Greene 2013; Sinhababu 2013). Thus, the status of the Means Principle in ordinary 
moral cognition informs a wide range of debates, from empirical questions about human nature 
to moral questions about the plausibility of certain ethical traditions. 
 Participants in such debates have understandably focused attention on numerous 
experiments that have reported a means/byproduct effect in moral judgment. Some researchers 
have reported the effect among adults and often when using the famous trolley dilemmas or other 
similar sacrificial dilemmas involving life and death (e.g. Mikhail 2002; Cushman et al 2006; 
Hauser et al 2007; Sinnott-Armstrong et al 2008; Moore et al. 2008; Cushman & Young 2011). 
                                                
2 Side effects are notoriously difficult to define, but for our purposes a side effect is (roughly) an effect of an 
individual’s action that is not a goal of hers or a means to one of her goals (cf. Cushman & Mele 2008: 179). 
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But other studies have apparently generated the effect using non-trolley dilemmas or in other 
areas of moral judgment, such as situations involving bodily harm, cheating, financial loss, 
pollution, and property damage (e.g. Nichols & Mallon 2006; DeScioli et al 2012; Gold et al 
2013; Millar et al 2014; Kelman & Kreps 2014; May ms-b). Moreover, some studies have found 
the means/byproduct effect in children (e.g. Pellizzoni et al 2010; Mikhail 2011) and non-
Western populations (e.g. Hauser et al 2007; Abarbanell & Hauser 2010; Mikhail 2011; Moore et 
al 2011a; Ahlenius & Tännsjö 2012; Kawai et al 2014).  
 However, there are reasons to worry that the purported effect is not robust or perhaps 
even non-existent. First, some of these studies appear to have confounds, conjoining harming as 
a means with other factors relevant to moral cognition, including contact, commission, battery, 
and personal force (Greene et al 2009; May 2014; Mikhail 2014). Consider, for example, what is 
arguably the most famous pair of cases in this literature: Switch and Footbridge. In Switch, the 
protagonist can either do nothing and let an empty runaway trolley kill five innocent people 
stuck on the tracks or flip a switch that will divert the trolley to a side-track with only one 
innocent person on it. Here, sacrificing one for the greater good involves only causing a death as 
a side effect of a noble goal. In Footbridge, the protagonist is on a bridge and can save the five 
only by pushing a man onto the tracks who is large enough to stop the trolley with his body. Here, 
the actor can promote the greater good by killing not only as a means but in a violent way that 
requires up-close and personal contact with the victim. And some experiments suggest an 
important interaction effect between harming as a means and using personal force (Greene et al 
2009). 
A second worry is that the differences in people’s judgments are rather small when we 
focus on vignettes that don’t involve confounds such as personal contact. Consider, for example, 
one pair of trolley cases that remove the contact confound. In Loop, the side track circles back 
around and the trolley will return toward the five if it continues around the loop, but there is one 
innocent man stuck on the looping track who is large enough to stop the trolley from continuing 
on to kill the five. Like Footbridge, killing the man on the loop track is likely to be represented 
as harming as a means, but it doesn’t involve up-close and personal contact. Now contrast Loop 
with Man-in-Front, in which the only change is that behind the one man on the loop track is a 
large boulder sufficient on its own to stop the trolley. Killing the one now looks to be a mere side 
effect of smashing the empty trolley into the boulder. Some early studies report that moral 
judgments diverge about this minimal pair of cases: more people regard Man-in-Front as morally 
permissible than Loop (Hauser et al 2007; Mikhail 2011).  
Such studies may provide hope that the Means Principle does guide ordinary moral 
cognition when problematic confounds are removed. However, some have noted (e.g. Enoch 
2013: 10) that, while the differences in permissibility judgments between the classic 
Switch/Footbridge pair are consistently quite large (e.g. 85% and 12%), the differences in the 
Man-in-Front/Loop pair are much smaller (e.g. 72% and 56% in Hauser et al 2007) suggesting 
that personal contact moderates the effect. Similarly, studies using continuous measures of moral 
judgments often find exceedingly small differences on a fine-grained scale (see e.g. Cushman et 
al 2006; Cushman & Young 2011). So, even if the differences in intuitions are statistically 
significant, it’s unclear whether the Means Principle has a powerful impact on moral cognition 
(cf. May 2014; Cushman 2016).  
A final worry about the means/byproduct effect involves replication. At least for 
vignettes that don’t appear to involve confounds, there have been some failures to replicate the 
means/byproduct effect (e.g. Waldmann & Dieterich 2007; Greene et al 2009; Zimmerman 2013; 
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May ms-a). For example, while the proportion of permissibility judgments tends to go down 
when death is brought about as a means (Loop) rather than a mere side-effect (Man-in-Front), 
two subsequent studies using this same categorical measure have found that participants are 
inclined to think it’s permissible to sacrifice the one for the greater good in both cases (see Table 
1). 
 
Table 1: Examples of Inconsistent Categorical Data 
 Mikhail (2002/2011) 
Hauser et al 
(2007) 
Zimmerman 
(2013) 
May 
(ms) 
Loop 48% 56% 89% 77% 
Man-in-Front 62% 72% 89% 77% 
 
Note. Percentages indicate the proportion of participants reporting that the choice of killing 
one to save five is morally permissible. 
 
 
One might try to explain the small effect size or the inconsistent data by pointing to 
another body of research on the side-effect effect. Participants are consistently more inclined to 
say that an individual brought about a side effect intentionally if the side effect is bad as opposed 
to good (Knobe 2010). When researchers try to study the means/byproduct effect, they generate 
cases in which the protagonist is generating bad outcomes, such as the death of an innocent 
person. But, given such negative consequences of the well-intentioned action, it might be 
difficult for people to see such outcomes as being mere side effects (as in Switch). So such “side 
effects” might be represented as more intentional, perhaps even intended, much like cases in 
which the protagonist is supposed to have generated an outcome as a means (as in Footbridge). 
Perhaps for some participants the side-effect effect masks the difference between generating a 
bad outcome as a means versus a byproduct, which leads to similar moral judgments about the 
relevant pairs of cases. 
There are at least two reasons to doubt that this masking account explains the different 
results across studies. First, if people treat the bad side effects as more like harming as a means, 
then permissibility judgments should be equally low in both cases, not equally high. Second, 
some studies indicate that, for whatever reason, the side-effect effect doesn’t play a role in the 
trolley-type cases, since people do treat harming as a byproduct as less intentional than harming 
as a means (e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong et al 2008, Table 1; Cushman & Young 2011; Watkins & 
Laham 2016).  
There is thus a need for a meta-analysis to estimate the overall effect size in an effort to 
determine the robustness of the apparent means/byproduct effect. Such an endeavor could also 
reveal whether the effect is moderated by other factors, particularly personal contact. The results 
of our meta-analysis are complex but suggest that, while the means/byproduct distinction is 
reflected in everyday moral cognition, the effect is almost completely moderated by personal 
contact. Our results are consistent with various studies contained within the meta-analysis itself, 
including those that report a pure means/byproduct effect (e.g. Cushman et al. 2006) and those 
that report an interaction with personal contact (Greene et al. 2009). However, as we’ll later 
discuss, the exact theoretical upshot of this state of affairs is important and as yet unresolved. 
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2. Methods 
2.1 Search Criteria 
The main goal of the meta-analysis was to determine the extent to which the Means Principle is 
present in everyday moral judgments about the rightness or wrongness of various acts. To that 
end, we established the following criteria for including empirical studies in the meta-analysis.  
First, the studies had to compare moral judgments about both outcomes caused as a 
means and as a byproduct. So, for example, studies were excluded if they simply measured 
moral judgments about a harm caused as a byproduct (e.g. in the Switch case) but not as a means.  
Second, the judgments had to be about what one should or shouldn’t do in a situation. For 
our purposes, this category includes judgments about an action’s wrongness, moral acceptability 
or appropriateness, and which choice one would make (given that it’s clear a moral dilemma is 
at issue). Previous research suggests there are important differences between judgements about 
acts being wrong/inappropriate and judgments about individuals as blameworthy/deserving of 
punishment (e.g. Cushman 2008; O’Hara et al. 2010). So, while other judgments may concern 
ethics or morality (e.g. attributions of responsibility, praise, blame, or virtue), we excluded 
studies that did not measure participant’s beliefs about which action one ought to perform. 
Provided the measured judgments were about what one should do, they could be about any type 
of action, not just those that cause harm (e.g., in the classic Switch and Footbridge cases). While 
harm is a paradigmatic instance of a moral violation, the Means Principle should surface for 
other actions that are morally relevant, such as violations of property rights.  
 
2.2 Literature Search 
Our search for articles occurred from July 7, 2015 to July 12, 2015 and then again from 
December 1, 2016 to February 10, 2017.  We began by searching Google Scholar, Web of 
Science, and ProQuest Psychology Journals for articles using the following keywords (no 
restrictions on publication date): common sense morality, action versus omission and moral 
judgments, trolley problem, trolley problems and studies, trolley problem and empirical data, 
trolley dilemma and studies, trolley dilemma and empirical data, moral dilemmas and studies, 
moral dilemma and empirical data, doctrine of double effect and studies, instrumental vs 
incidental studies. With the resulting papers, we did forward and backward citation searches. We 
ultimately identified 69 unique papers whose abstracts we reviewed to see if the paper likely 
contained studies relevant to the means/byproduct distinction. If the abstract indicated the paper 
likely contained relevant studies, we read the full papers to determine if the inclusion criteria 
were met. This method left 50 articles with data to be extracted.  
We also attempted to minimize publication bias to avoid inflating mean effect sizes. 
Compared to unpublished studies, published studies more often are “conventionally significant” 
and are likely to have higher estimated effect sizes. So including only published studies would 
tend to over-estimate the mean effect size in the meta-analysis. Unpublished studies were 
solicited via personal communication and by posting calls for unpublished data on well-
trafficked, highly visible blogs and listservs (i.e., Experimental Philosophy Blog, Brains Blog, 
The Moral Psychology Group on Facebook, the Judgment and Decision Making Listserv, the 
Society for Philosophy and Psychology Listserv). These calls yielded an additional 11 studies 
that met the inclusion criteria for the meta-analysis.  
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2.3 Variables in Studies 
The studies included in the meta-analysis (k = 101, Table 2) varied in a number of ways. First, 
some measured moral judgments using a categorical variable (e.g. permissible/impermissible) 
while others used a continuous variable (e.g. a 9-point scale of moral acceptability).  
Second, some studies had a within-subjects (rather than between-subjects) design, where 
each participant responded to both kinds of cases under investigation (e.g. Switch and 
Footbridge). Some of the studies that used a within-subjects design tested for order effects by 
presenting each participant with multiple vignettes in different orders. In such cases, we 
calculated the mean response across all orders of presentation for use in the meta-analysis.  
Third, some studies conducted multiple experiments on the same participants but not in a 
between-subjects design (e.g., participants were given five means scenarios and five byproduct 
scenarios). In those instances, we treated those multiple studies as one unit in the meta-analysis 
and took the mean of responses.  
Fourth, most of the studies used slightly different materials that are too idiosyncratic to 
describe meaningfully. However, one major dimension that clearly differentiated some studies 
from others was the use of personal or bodily contact (e.g. pushing or bumping) in the means 
condition but not in the byproduct condition. We decided to focus only on the broad and intuitive 
notion of contact rather than related categories that are more fine-grained and theory-driven, such 
as personal force (Greene et al 2009), prototypically violent acts (Greene 2013), and battery 
(Mikhail 2014). 
 
Table 2: Studies and brief description of studies in the meta-analysis 
 
Study # Authors Year Design Data 
Personal 
Contact 
1 Moore et al 2008 Between Categorical No 
2 May unpublished Between Categorical No 
3 Mikhail 2002 Between Categorical Yes 
4 Nichols & Mallon 2006 Between Categorical No 
5 Zimmerman 2013 Between Categorical No 
6 Mikhail 2011 Between Categorical Yes 
7 Mikhail 2011 Between Categorical Yes 
8 Mikhail 2011 Between Categorical No 
9 May unpublished Between Categorical No 
10 May unpublished Between Categorical No 
11 May unpublished Between Categorical No 
12 Hauser et al 2007 Between Categorical Yes 
13 Hauser et al 2007 Between Categorical No 
14 Nakamura unpublished Between Categorical Yes 
15 Pellizzoni et al 2010 Within Categorical Yes 
16 Nichols & Mallon 2006 Within Categorical No 
17 Ahlenius & Taennsjoe 2012 Within Categorical Yes 
18 Cote et al 2013 Within Categorical Yes 
19 Lotto et al 2014 Within Categorical Yes 
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20 Koengis et al 2007 Within Categorical yes 
21 Rusch 2015 Within Categorical Yes 
22 Sarlo et al 2012 Within Categorical Yes 
23 Costa et al 2014 Within Categorical Yes 
24 Fumagalli et al 2010 Within Categorical Yes 
25 Koenigs et al 2012 Within Categorical Yes 
26 Manfrinait et al 2013 Within Categorical Yes 
27 Moore et al 2011a Within Categorical Yes 
28 Moore et al 2011a Within Categorical Yes 
29 More et al 2011b Within Categorical Yes 
30 Millar et al 2014 Between Continuous Yes 
31 Millar et al 2014 Between Continuous Yes 
32 Millar et al 2014 Between Continuous Yes 
33 Millar et al 2014 Between Continuous No 
34 Greene et al 2009 Between Continuous No 
35 Geren et al 2009 Between Continuous Yes 
36 Shallow et al 2011 Between Continuous Yes 
37 Gold et al 2013 Between Continuous Yes 
38 Wiegmann et al 2013 Between Continuous Yes 
39 Wiegmann et al 2013 Between Continuous Yes 
40 Wiegmann et al 2013 Between Continuous Yes 
41 Wiegmann et al 2013 Between Continuous Yes 
42 Lombrozo 2008 Between Continuous Yes 
43 Sinnott-Armstrong et al 2008 Between Continuous No 
44 Waldmann & Dieterich 2007 Between Continuous No 
45 Zimmerman 2013 Between Continuous No 
46 Waldmann & Wiegmann 2010 Between Continuous No 
47 Shepard unpublished Between Continuous No 
48 Amit & Greene 2012 Between Continuous Yes 
49 Broeders et al 2011 Between Continuous Yes 
50 Broeders et al 2011 Between Continuous Yes 
51 Broeders et al 2011 Between Continuous Yes 
52 Kelman & Kreps 2014 Between Continuous Yes 
53 Kelman & Kreps 2014 Between Continuous Yes 
54 Kelman & Kreps 2014 Between Continuous Yes 
55 Horne & Powell 2016 Between Continuous Yes 
56 Horne & Powell 2016 Between Continuous Yes 
57 Watkins & Laham 2016 Between Continuous Yes 
58 Watkins 2016 Between Continuous Yes 
59 Watkins 2016 Between Continuous Yes 
60 Watkins 2016 Between Continuous Yes 
61 Watkins & Laham unpublished Between Continuous No 
62 Cao et al 2017 Between Continuous Yes 
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63 Cao et al 2017 Between Continuous Yes 
64 Cao et al 2017 Between Continuous Yes 
65 Sytsma & Livengood unpublished Between Continuous Yes 
66 Sytsma & Livengood unpublished Between Continuous Yes 
67 Sytsma & Livengood unpublished Between Continuous Yes 
68 Wiegmann et al 2012 Between Continuous Yes 
69 Wiegmann et al 2012 Between Continuous No 
70 Cushman & Young 2011 Within Continuous No 
71 Cushman & Young 2011 Within Continuous No 
72 Cushman & Young 2011 Within Continuous No 
73 Cushman & Young 2011 Within Continuous No 
74 Cushman et al 2006 Within Continuous No 
75 Schwitzgebel & Cushman 2012 Within Continuous Yes 
76 Liao et al 2012 Within Continuous Yes 
77 Kawai et al 2014 Within Continuous Yes 
78 Kawai et al 2014 Within Continuous Yes 
79 Kawai et al 2014 Within Continuous Yes 
80 Kawai et al 2014 Within Continuous Yes 
81 Abarbanell & Hauser 2010 Within Continuous Yes 
82 DeScioli et al 2012 Within Continuous No 
83 DeScioli et al 2012 Within Continuous No 
84 Wiegmann et al 2013 Within Continuous Yes 
85 Lombrozo 2008 Within Continuous Yes 
86 Lotto et al 2014 Within Continuous Yes 
87 Tempesta et al 2011 Within Continuous Yes 
88 Christensen et al 2014 Within Continuous Yes 
89 Christensen et al 2014 Within Continuous No 
90 Ugazio et al 2012 Within Continuous Yes 
91 Ugazio et al 2012 Within Continuous Yes 
92 Watkins 2016 Within Continuous Yes 
93 Watkins 2016 Within Continuous Yes 
94 Watkins 2016 Within Continuous Yes 
95 Laham & Watkins unpublished Within Continuous No 
96 Wiegmann et al 2012 Within Continuous No 
97 Wiegmann & Waldman 2014 Within Continuous Yes 
98 Wiegmann & Waldman 2015 Within Continuous Yes 
99 Wiegmann & Waldman 2016 Within Continuous Yes 
100 Wiegmann & Waldman 2017 Within Continuous Yes 
101 Wiegmann & Waldman 2018 Within Continuous Yes 
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3. Results 
 
Meaningful comparisons between studies with different designs are difficult to make in a meta-
analysis (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). So three separate meta-analyses were performed on studies 
collecting: within-subjects continuous data (within-continuous), between-subjects continuous 
data (between-continuous), and categorical data. We did not conduct separate meta-analyses on 
within and between subjects categorical data. Rather, the study design was a moderator variable 
for categorical data to determine if differences in designs matter to overall effect size estimates 
(Morris & DeShon, 2002). Each meta-analysis used different effect size estimates: log odds 
ratios for the categorical data;3 standardized mean differences for the between-continuous data; 
and standardized mean change for the within-continuous data.  
For within-continuous studies, one necessary piece of information is the correlation 
between the two key moral judgments under investigation (i.e., judgments about cases of 
generating an outcome either as a byproduct or as a means). No study that used a within-
continuous design reported the correlation, so we estimated that the correlation is .5 and used 
that value in calculations. (The correlation is used when calculating the standard errors and, 
consequently, estimates of variability. If a larger r value is used, SEs should be smaller than 
when a smaller r value is used.)  
Despite the differences in designs, the three meta-analyses proceeded in the same way. 
The Metafor (Viechtbauer, 2010) package for R (R Core Team, 2014) was the tool of choice for 
all analyses and graphics. Since variability in estimates typically decreases with larger sample 
sizes, we weighted studies by the inverse of the variance (1/variance) (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; 
Viechtbauer 2010), giving those with larger samples more importance in the meta-analysis than 
studies with smaller samples. For each meta-analysis, we fit random-effects models with 
restricted maximum likelihood estimation (Viechtbauer, 2010), which estimate the precision of 
the effect size taking into account sampling level error and random error. We also performed a 
moderator analysis for each meta-analysis to help identify a source of differences in the 
distribution of effect sizes. One prominent confound in the studies was contact versus no contact. 
For this reason, the two authors independently coded the contact/no contact moderator with near 
perfect agreement (95%, kappa = .88, z = 8.78, p < .001), with the few instances of disagreement 
settled by discussion.  
 
3.1 Within-Continuous Data 
We first analyzed studies that used a within-subjects design and measured moral judgments with 
a continuous variable (k  = 31). There was an overall, moderately sized mean effect: 
standardized mean change = 0.57, 95% CI 0.44 - 0.69, SE = .06, z = 8.73, p < .001 (see Figure 1). 
  
                                                
3 A standard effect size for categorical variables is the odds ratio, but the odds ratio is not easily incorporated into a 
meta-analysis. The odds ratio is centered on 1 (indicating no effect), with values less than 1 indicating a negative 
relation, values greater than 1 as positive relations. And the odds ratio can never be less than 0 which makes it 
peculiar. To illustrate, on odds ratio of 0.5 is of the same magnitude as an odds ratio of 2. Consequently, most meta-
analyses take the natural logarithm of the odds ratio as the unit to be analyzed in a meta-analysis (Lipsey & Wilson, 
2001). To convert back to the more easily interpretable odds ratio one can use the following formula: elogOR, where e 
is the base of the natural logarithm (about 2.718) (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001, p. 54).   
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Figure 1: Forest Plot for Continuous, within-subjects studies 
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A visual inspection of the funnel plot did not indicate publication bias (see Figure 2). 
This was confirmed with a regression test using the standard error as the predictor, t (30) = 0.06, 
p = .95 (Egger et al, 1997; Viechtbauer, 2010). While the regression suggested a lack of 
publication bias, we performed two tests for Failsafe Ns.4 The Rosenthal method estimates the 
number of studies with an average effect size of zero would be needed to be included in the 
meta-analysis for the mean effect size to be non-significant (e.g., p > .05) (Rosenthal, 1979). The 
Rosenthal method suggested that 12,567 studies would have to be added for the mean effect size 
to be non-significant. We also conducted a different Failsafe N based on Orwin’s (1983) method. 
Orwin’s method provides the number of studies that would need to be added to the meta-analysis 
with an average effect size of zero to reach some target mean effect size. We selected 0.13 as the 
target mean effect size because that value is the difference between the estimated standardized 
mean change and the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval. This method suggested that 
110 studies would have to be added to the meta-analysis to reach that target overall mean effect 
size. Consequently, this meta-analysis should be robust to studies that are not included.  
As the funnel indicates, there was a great deal of heterogeneity in effect sizes, Q (df = 31) 
= 320.87, p < .001, I2 = .94. The substantial heterogeneity suggested that moderator variables 
might be able to account for some of the variance in the distribution of effect sizes. A mixed-
model analysis using contact/no contact as the moderator variable indicated that this moderator 
accounted for a significant amount of the variation in effect sizes: Qm (df = 1) = 18.04, p < .001. 
More specifically, the mean effect size was significant when contact was involved (standardized 
mean change = 0.71, 95% CI 0.59 – 0.83 z = 11.5, p < .001), but was substantially less (about a 
third the size) when contact was absent (standardized mean change = 0.24, 95% CI 0.05 – 0.42, 
z = 2.53, p = 0.01).  
  
                                                
4 Failsafe Ns are sometimes difficult to interpret and the regression on the funnel plot is a better method to detect 
publication bias (Becker, 2005). However, the failsafe Ns can be helpful to illustrate what the magnitude of 
unreported studies would have to be to change mean effect sizes to non-significant.  
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Figure 2: Funnel plot for continuous, within studies 
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3.2 Between-Continuous Data 
Next we analyzed studies that used continuous measures of moral judgments in a between-
subjects design (k  = 40). There was an overall, moderately sized mean effect: standardized mean 
difference = 0.87, 95% CI 0.67 – 1.06, SE = .1, z = 8.69, p < .001 (see Figure 3).  
A visual inspection of the funnel plot did not reveal evidence for publication bias (see 
Figure 4). A regression test using the standard error as the predictor did not reveal evidence of 
publication bias, t (38) = 1.28, p = .21 (see Figures 3 and 4). To provide additional evidence 
against publication bias in this meta-analysis, we tested file-drawer effects with two different 
methods. The Rosenthal method suggested that 12,616 studies with no effects would have to be 
added for the mean effect size to be non-significant. We also used the Orwin Method with the 
target mean effect size of 0.2 (the difference between the estimated mean effect size and the  
lower bound of the 95% confidence interval). The Orwin method suggested that 98 studies with a 
mean effect of zero are required to reduce the overall mean effect size to that target level. 
Consequently, this meta-analysis should be robust to studies that are not included.  
Again there was a great deal of heterogeneity in effect sizes, Q (df = 39) = 428.6, p 
< .001, I2 = .92. So we performed a mixed-model analysis using contact/no contact as the 
moderator variable. The analysis suggested that the contact moderator accounted for a significant 
amount of the variation in effect sizes: Qm (df = 1) =  6.84, p = .009. The mean effect size, again, 
was significant when contact was involved (standardized mean difference = 0.99, 95% CI 0.79-
1.2, z = 9.61, p < .001), but was much smaller (by more than a half) when contact was absent 
(standardized mean difference = 0.41, 95% CI 0.02 – 0.8, z = 2.04, p = 0.02). 
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Figure 3: Forest plot for between, continuous studies 
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Figure 4:  Funnel plot for between, continuous studies 
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3.3 Categorical Data 
Finally, we analyzed studies that used categorical measures of moral judgment, including both 
between- or within-subjects designs (k  = 30). There was an overall, large mean effect: log odds 
ratio = 1.59, 95% CI 1.15 – 2.02, SE = .22, z = 7.09, p < .001 (see Figure 5).  
A visual inspection of the funnel plot did not reveal evidence for publication bias (see 
Figure 6). A regression test using the standard error as the predictor did not reveal evidence of 
publication bias, t (28) = 0.33, p = .74 (see Figures 5 and 6). To provide additional evidence 
against publication bias in this meta-analysis, we tested file-drawer effects with two different 
methods. The Rosenthal method suggested that 9,062 studies with no effects would have to be 
added for the mean effect size to be non-significant. We also used the Orwin method with target 
mean effect size of 0.44 (the difference between the overall mean effect size and the lower bound 
of the 95% confidence interval). The Orwin method suggested that 88 studies would have to be 
added to reach that target effect size. Consequently, this meta-analysis should be robust to 
studies that are not included.  
As with the previous analyses, there was a great deal of heterogeneity in effect sizes Q(df 
= 29) = 758.24, p < .001, I2 = .95. Studies using categorical measures called for two different 
moderator analyses. First, we tested whether between- or within-subjects designs significantly 
influenced mean effect sizes (Morris & DeShon, 2002). A mixed-model analysis using the study 
design as the moderator did not account for a significant amount of the variation in effect sizes: 
Qm(df = 1) =  0.17, p = 0.69. When a within-subjects design was used (log odds ratio = 1.67, 95% 
CI 1.07 – 2.27, z = 5.47, p < .001) the overall mean effect size and confidence intervals were 
similar to when a between-subjects design was used (log odds ratio = 1.49, 95% CI 0.83 – 2.15, 
z = 4.41, p < .001). Second, a mixed-model analysis using contact/no contact as the moderator 
variable suggested again that the personal contact moderator accounted for a significant amount 
of the variation in effect sizes: Qm(df = 1) =  8.25, p = .004. When personal contact was involved, 
the pattern of results typical of the Means Principle was large and significant (log odds ratio = 
2.97, 95% CI 1.50 – 2.45, z = 8.14, p < .001) but was much smaller in the absence of personal 
contact (log odds ratio = 0.78, 95% CI 0.13 – 1.44, z = 2.33, p = .02). To convert these values 
back into a more interpretable effect size, the odds ratio involving contact is very large, OR = 
19.48, whereas the odds ratio involving non-contact is small, OR = 2.18.  
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Figure 5: Forest plot for categorical studies 
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Figure 6: Funnel plot for categorical studies 
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3. Discussion 
 
Our meta-analysis is clear. First, the means/byproduct effect does appear in everyday moral 
judgments. Across one hundred and one studies using different designs, samples, and types of 
measures of moral judgment, the asymmetry in responses typical of the Means Principle was 
medium to large. However, consistent with two experiments reported by Greene and his 
collaborators (2009), these overall effects were qualified by an important moderator: personal 
contact. When personal contact was not present, the pattern of response predicted by the Means 
Principle was dramatically reduced. The estimates of the mean effect size are also likely to be 
accurate and robust given the absence of evidence of publication bias.  
So is the Doctrine of Double Effect, or something quite like it, tacitly assumed in 
ordinary moral cognition? Does such a principle have a legitimate claim to being an innate 
element of universal moral grammar? To address the theoretical debates about the 
means/byproduct distinction, we must determine the significance of its being moderated by 
personal contact. There are three kinds of theoretical conclusions one might draw concerning the 
Means Principle. 
 
4.1 Skeptical Conclusion 
One might argue that the Means Principle alone doesn’t shape ordinary moral cognition. The 
effect is sufficiently robust only when combined with personal contact or a related factor. 
Perhaps the small effect one can detect should be construed as a performance error or otherwise 
not a phenomenon on which we should build our theories of moral psychology. Greene (2013: 
246), for example, argues that the means/side-effect distinction, along with act/omission and 
personal force, “are not three separate criteria, employed in checklist fashion.” Instead, these 
factors are “intertwined… forming an organic whole” that triggers a psychological “alarm gizmo” 
which is sensitive to prototypically violent acts. 
Given that the Doctrine of Double Effect relies on the Means Principle alone and not on 
its interaction with anything like personal contact or prototypical violence, the skeptical 
conclusion has important implications. Contrary to many theorists, Double Effect wouldn’t have 
“considerable intuitive appeal” (McIntyre 2001: 219); wouldn’t be able to “explain some 
otherwise puzzling cases” (Scanlon 2008: 1); wouldn’t be presupposed by a “range of moral 
beliefs that have been comparatively stable over time and across cultures” (Wedgwood 2011: 
392); and wouldn’t be an element of an innate “moral grammar” (Mikhail 2011). Moreover, if 
the Means Principle isn’t implicit in our basic modes of moral thinking, then we lose a 
presumptive reason for believing that Double Effect and similar principles are ethically and 
legally sound. The skeptical conclusion may thus support attempts to debunk such principles as 
morally suspect or unreliable (e.g. Greene 2013; Sinhababu 2013). Even if debunkers have 
nothing to undermine in ordinary moral thinking, its absence may still help to undermine the 
principle’s plausibility.  
However, the skeptical conclusion is doubtful given that the means/byproduct effect is 
not entirely moderated by personal contact. While violent acts may typically involve harming as 
a means in an active and personal way, the means/byproduct effect appears to arise when the 
relevant outcome isn’t even harmful, active, or up-close and personal. The pure unmoderated 
effect may be small, but our meta-analysis suggests it is real, even when using a variety of 
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measures of moral cognition. Some studies failed to detect the pure effect but this is most likely 
because those studies are not sufficiently powered.  
 
4.2 Non-Skeptical Conclusion 
A second possible conclusion is decidedly non-skeptical: the means/byproduct distinction does 
shape ordinary moral cognition and personal contact helps to facilitate it. Personal contact could, 
for example, merely draw one’s attention to the fact that an outcome is brought about as a means 
to an end, which one does treat as independently significant (cf. Locke ms). On this account, 
personal contact and related factors merely enable one to detect or notice that the outcome is 
generated as a means rather than a byproduct.  
Compare how this might go in a non-moral example. Your judgment that an object is red 
is influenced by how it visually appears, which is heavily moderated by whether your eyes are 
open. However, while your perceptual experience is treated as relevant to judging the color of 
the object, having your eyes open isn’t. Indeed, your visual experience arguably provides a 
reason for believing that the object is red while the fact that your eyes are open doesn’t. One fact 
is a reason while the other is a mere “enabling condition” (cf. Burge 1988: 654-5). Similarly, 
personal contact may merely help many people focus on the factor they treat as morally relevant: 
causing as a means.  
Our meta-analysis is compatible with this non-skeptical account. However, proponents of 
Double Effect and related principles don’t typically take the means/byproduct distinction to be 
difficult to appreciate, let alone noticeable only when personal contact is also contrasted. So our 
meta-analysis suggests that a non-skeptical account requires some theoretical revision. 
 
4.3 Moderately Skeptical Conclusion 
A third kind of conclusion is somewhere in between the two extremes and is thus moderately 
skeptical: moral judgment is influenced by whether a harm is brought about by an action that 
involves both personal contact and harming as a means. Why might we care primarily about the 
combination of these two factors? We can think of four possible theories. 
First, we may have evolved to be sensitive to prototypically violent acts, which involve 
actively and personally causing harm as a means (cf. Greene 2013: ch. 9). While the Means 
Principle does not necessarily have independent significance in moral cognition, it interacts with 
something like personal contact, making harming as a means an essential element of a broader 
category. The account is moderately skeptical because it does undermine the idea that the Means 
Principle itself is an element of moral cognition, which may fund attempts to undermine its 
normative significance. However, it’s important to consider that some of the studies reporting a 
means/byproduct effect involve non-violent actions, such as property damage (e.g. Millar et al 
2014), financial loss (e.g. Gold et al 2013), and minor impersonal harm (e.g. Kelman & Kreps 
2014; May ms-b). Unfortunately, since too few studies use such stimuli, we couldn’t 
meaningfully test for violence as a moderator. Further research could help adjudicate these issues.  
Second, instead of prototypical violence, the more general factor that influences moral 
cognition could be something like agential involvement—the degree to which the agent is 
involved in generating the consequences (Wedgwood 2011; May forthcoming). Even if harming 
as a means doesn’t by itself influence moral thinking, there is some evidence that it contributes 
to our perception that the individual intentionally generated the relevant outcome (cf. Cushman 
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& Young 2011). Like impersonal contact and omissions, generating an outcome as a side effect 
may contribute to the perception that the agent was less involved (compare Foot 1984), 
constituting one way to “get one’s hands dirty.” Like the appeal to prototypical violence, this 
view is moderately skeptical because the means/byproduct distinction is only significant insofar 
as it’s bound up with the broader category of agential involvement.  
A third version of the moderately skeptical account involves individual differences. 
Perhaps for some people the means/byproduct distinction is prominent whereas for others it is 
not. There is growing evidence that there are important individual differences in people’s 
philosophically relevant judgments (Feltz & Cokely in press; 2013). To illustrate, imagine that 
for roughly half of people the means/byproduct distinction is strong (e.g., standardized mean 
difference = 1). However, for the other half of people the distinction is completely absent (e.g., 
standardized mean difference = 0). If we average across those groups of people in the experiment, 
we would get a standardized mean difference of about 0.5—roughly what we actually observe. 
Consequently, the meta-analysis is consistent with a moderately skeptical account where the 
distinction does matter but only for some people.  
A final route to moderate skepticism about the Means Principle restricts its scope. 
Empirical and theoretical investigations of the means/byproduct effect have treated such 
principles as being unrestricted or as applying to all moral norms. Perhaps, though, the principle 
is relevant to only some types of norms (compare Young & Saxe 2011; Walen 2016). While 
many of the experimental vignettes have involved dilemmas of life and death, perhaps these are 
precisely the situations in which it makes least sense to draw the distinction. In general, we don’t 
seem to think people are entitled to risk causing the death of others, either as a means or as a 
byproduct. However, it seems more important to distinguish whether someone violates other 
norms purposefully or merely knowingly, particularly when we think people are generally 
entitled to risk the negative outcomes involved in violating the norm, such as pollution or 
property damage. Yet these are some of the studies in which we find a means/byproduct effect in 
the absence of personal contact (e.g. DeScioli et al 2012; Millar et al 2014; May ms-b). Again, 
unfortunately few studies differ in this respect, so we could not test for different norm-violations 
as moderators. Further research could help to settle the matter. 
This last account also fits with some findings that have implications for hotly debated 
topics in applied ethics. For example, in the euthanasia debate, it is often thought that bringing 
about a death as a goal is worse than bringing about a death as a merely foreseen consequence. 
Some studies suggest that this general pattern is not reflected in everyday judgments about the 
moral permissibility of some kinds of euthanasia. One series of experiments systematically 
manipulated the description of euthanasia (e.g., physician assisted suicide, aid in dying, 
euthanasia) but found no difference in moral responses when the death was brought about as a 
means as opposed to a foreseen side-effect (Feltz, in press; but compare DeScioli et al 2012). 
Rather, the major factor that distinguishes moral judgments about euthanasia is the voluntariness 
of the death. When the patient specifically requests death, it is deemed to be much more 
permissible than when it is not brought about voluntarily. This general pattern of results has been 
replicated using recent scales for measuring attitudes about euthanasia (Feltz & Cokely, ms; Ho, 
1998). Thus, the means/byproduct distinction might not be as important as many have thought 
for explaining certain contemporary moral disputes. If the distinction has any importance in 
commonsense moral reasoning, it may be restricted to only certain norms. Further studies could 
address this issue by extending existing research (e.g. DeScioli et al. 2012; Millar et al 2014) that 
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probes intuitions about real moral disputes (e.g. abortion, torture, casualties of war, affirmative 
action), rather than just trolley dilemmas.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
On the basis of experimental findings, many scientists, policy-makers, and philosophers have 
concluded that people’s moral intuitions consistently treat bringing about a bad outcome as a 
means to an end as much worse than doing so as a mere side effect. Killing one innocent person 
to save five, for example, is apparently conceived as more morally acceptable if the death of the 
one is a mere side effect of saving the five rather than an integral part of one’s plan to promote 
the greater good. Proponents of the relevant principle, such as the Doctrine of Double Effect, 
have praised the empirical results as demonstrating its importance in moral and legal reasoning. 
Opponents who have sought to debunk a principle like Double Effect have likewise assumed its 
presence in moral cognition. 
 The present meta-analysis, however, was motivated by failures to replicate the 
means/byproduct effect and by its frequently small size when reported. We found that the effect 
is robust but particularly when combined with personal contact. For example, people generally 
think it’s morally impermissible to kill one innocent person as a means to saving five when the 
killing involves pushing the one to his death. But we’re less inclined to regard this as morally 
dubious if the man can be used as a means by merely flipping a switch.  
The significance of the moderator result is difficult to determine at present. Some may 
take it as a death knell to Double Effect and its attendant Means Principle, but there is room to 
argue for less skeptical conclusions. Personal contact might merely draw one’s attention to the 
means/byproduct distinction, for example. Our meta-analysis alone cannot discern which 
conclusion is correct, but it does constrain the kinds of options available and guide future 
research. What’s clear is that the means/byproduct distinction does shape ordinary moral 
thinking, although its precise role has yet to be fully uncovered. 
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